WPCy P5.iʚr#.sz-њ7Gw9_r͑#C~ e?kKFry+ + vU/hm%&G; N4e4$[[ 0=X=wTd=SNrd+.P> 6I%y61["B"x#^5;84M~֪-z p5xlj?YյAFjrƫp{Z+LVZ_џ*@Pu@zmj%ѹ\Awp].be ]DfbX.S8.,d^0U4ik&${O#lQ-`VK%} N:Qn߅~תh<ڷ $^NeڑX-VY?eaX,h>@bh{"O>S\ &vmbkO<6Un> % U$ U:< Cv f a B 0 C  0U  %O 0A 0  ""UD}&&*i 0U0> 0b4>  @ 0*@@ 0 @#BNE^ EwE4EE mE(F ,F 0G#JEjLMlLMpLU.@tL 0L 0M 0N 0O 0rP 0ZQ 0?R 0!S 0T 0T 0U 0V 0yW 0RX 0(Y 0Y 0Z 0[ 0b\ 0C] 0!^ 0^ 0_ 0`U>{a 0a 0b 0Tc 00d 0<Md 0d 0>Ge 0ve 0`e 0`[f 0`f 0`g 0`{g 08g 0h 02h 0i 0:j 0YMj 0_j 0 k 0jl 0ym D/n D+,o 0Wo D/p 0 q 06q 0r 0:s B*Ps 0^zs 0<s 0NtU6btU>tU*ttttttu  x y  0 0D 0 0 0K 0 0 0F 0 0 0e 0 0 06 0ŏ 0L 0 0Б 0z 0 0 0T 0 0rUNDZU4E) Z&Roman-WP Normal,rAZ"Arial Regular dTable_A d($      [$X  h  6   _ԀThisisnotanargumentthatanyreferenceto thePeople,asinthecharging  document,instructions,etc.,isaperseviolation.(See Peoplev.Black (2003)  114_Cal.App_.4th830,rejectingsuchanargument.)Itnarrowlyfocusesonthe * prosecutorsimproperusageofthephrasetomakeitappeartothethatthecourt, < juryandtheprosecutionareononesidewiththedefendantontheother.*+ (_2623  .. [$X  h  7   _Ԁhh*hhԀ Abidingconvictionisanarcanelegaltermneedingprecisedefinitiongiven  itsimportancetotheconstitutionalstandardofproof(i.e.,thefilterbywhichthe  jurorsinterpretalltheevidence.).Thefollowingareexamplesoftermsthecourts $ haverequiredthetrialcourtstodefineforthejuryininstructions: 1) "accident" 6  ( Peoplev.Jimenez (1992)11Cal.App.4th1611,1628; 2) "aid"and"abet"  ( Peoplev.Ponce (1950)96Cal.App.2d327,331; 3) "assault";"assaultwitha  deadlyweapon"( Peoplev.Valenzuela (1985)175Cal.App.3d381,393; 4)  0 "conspiracy"( Peoplev.Earnest (1975)53Cal.App.3d734,745; 5) "efficient H interveningcause"( Peoplev . Hebert (1964)228Cal.App.2d514,520-21; 6)   ` "openingormaintaining"( Peoplev.Shoals (1992)8Cal.App.4th475,489-91; 7)  ( x "publicplace"( Peoplev . Belanger (1966)243Cal.App.2d654,657; 8)  @  "culpablenegligence"( Peoplev.Thurmond (1985)175Cal.App.3d865,872 X  873; 9) "traumaticcondition"( Peoplev.Burns (1948)88Cal.App.2d867,874; p   10) "unconscious"( Peoplev.Clark (1993)5Cal.4th950,1020(SupremeCourt   assumeswithoutdecidingthat"unconscious"requiresdefinition); 11) #*h*h߭#*h*h#h*h#hhh "proximate   causation"#hhh#hhh#hhhhߐ#hhhh (Peoplev.Bland (2002)28Cal.4th313,335)#hhhh߅##hhhC#*hh*h*h ;12) "unlawful"   ( Peoplev.Lilliock (1968)265Cal.App.2d419,428-9(alegaltermastowhich   thejuryneedsguidancefromthecourt);accord Barouhv.Haberman (1994)26 8  Cal.App.4th40,45.)#h*h ##hh= # E !X  T@RX3'X3'3' Letter3' LetterT @ @ @ h @ o  _Ԁ  1  hԀ Peoplev.Hill (1998)17Cal.4th800,823 p ,fn.1,heldthattheclaimofprosecutorial  misconductismoreproperlycalledprosecutorial error.#hD#*D+D (_25   ," <DL,23  ..," <DL,   *5+5 (_24  ) <DL)23  ..) <DL)    !X  T@RX3'X3'3' Letter3' LetterT @ @ @ h @ %  _Ԁ  4  hhAprosecutorhasthedutytoseethathisorherwitnessesvolunteerno  statementthatwouldbeinadmissibleandmustbeespeciallycarefultoguard   againststatementsthatwouldalsobeprejudicial.( Peoplev.Schiers (1971)19  Cal.App.3d102,113114.)Thisincludesadutytowarnthewitnessagainst  volunteeringinadmissiblestatements.See Peoplev.Warren (1988)45Cal.3d * 471,482483[247Cal.Rptr.172].hhhill  !X  T@RX3'X3'3' Letter3' LetterT @ @ @ h @ %  _:h: `   8  ڀON,hONCagewasdisapprovedonothergroundsin Estellev.McGuire (1991)502  U.S.62,73fn.4.   h      p     :h:.D4A`,HelvRmn-8 25inOne!  !X  T@RX3'X3'3' Letter3' LetterT @ @ @ h @ %  _Ԁ  9  ڀ hhVictor notedthatin1850, moralcertaintymeant thestateofsubjective  certitudeaboutsomeeventoroccurrence.( Id. at12.)Thatlevelofcertaintywas  appropriate,buttheCourtfearedthatthetermhadlostitsmeaningoverthenext 0 century.( Id. at23.)hh  !X  T@RX3'X3'3' Letter3' LetterT @ @ @ h @ %  _Ԁ  10  ڀhhOnefederaljudge,commentingontheinadequacyof abiding  convictionlanguageuntetheredtoacertaintyprinciple,said: The[Supreme]  Courtdidnotsuggestthat abidingconvictioninitselfstatedtheproperdegreeof $ certaintyorthatsuchtermdidsoinamannerthatcouldovercomeconflictingand 6 erroneousdefinitionsusedinthesameinstruction.Infact,thephraseemployedin H  Victor was abidingconvictiontoamoralcertainty,whichestablishesa  Z considerablyhigherstandardthandoesthesimpleterm abidingconviction " r withouttheaddedexponentialphrase.( Ramirezv.Hatcher (9thCir.1998)136 4  F.3d1209,1219(Reinhardtdissenting.)hh _ !X  T@RX3'X3'3' Letter3' LetterT @ @ @ h @ %  _Ԁ  11  ڀhhhh*hhThe abidingconvictionlanguagealoneisfartooweaktorequire  evidentiarycertainty.Onecase, Lisenbeev.Henry (9thCir.1999)166F.3d997,  rejectedtheargumentthat abidingconvictionaloneisdefective,butthebrief *  treatmentisdemonstrablyirrationalanderroneous.Thatcaseattemptedto  distinguish Coloradov.NewMexico ,467U.S.310,316(1984).There,the  Courtheldthattheremustbeastandardhigherthanmerepreponderancefor * settlingawaterdisputebetweentwostates.Itselectedthestandardof clearand < convincingevidencewhichitdefinedasanabidingconvictioninthetruthofthe N mattershowntoahighprobability. Ibid. 󀀀Seealso NewMexicov.House ,127  ` N.M.151(1999)(defining clearandconvincingevidenceas anabiding ( x conviction). Lisenbee distinguishedthe Colorado definitionofclearand :  convincingevidencebystating, AlthoughtheCourtdidusethephrase"abiding R  conviction"initsdefinitionoftheclearandconvincingevidencestandard,itdid d  sointandemwiththeuseofthephrase"highlyprobable."Colorado,467U.S.at v  316,104S.Ct.at243738,81L.Ed.2d247.Thelanguageinthejuryinstruction   inthiscase,ontheotherhand,doesnot.Precisely.TheCaliforniastandarddoes   notaddtheterm highlyprobabletothephrase abidingconviction.Howthen   wouldtheomissionofthe highlyprobablephraseconveyahigherstandardof  proof(beyondareasonabledoubt)thanthatinvolvedintheColoradocivil   dispute?Obviously,theabsenceofaprobabilitystandardcouldnotpossibly 2 elevateafeelingoflastingbeliefinthechargetooneofnearcertitude.Thisisno D meresemanticdiscussion. Addingtonv.Texas, 441U.S.418,425(1979)(a V standardofproofismorethananemptysemanticexercise.)In InreWinship , n supraat363,theCourtemphasizedthe vitalroleintheAmericanschemeof 2 criminalprocedureofthereasonabledoubtstandard,onethatinsurespersonsare D notconvictedbasedonthesamelowerlevelofproofforaciviljudgment.#h*h߂#)@ ZRoman-WP($2[$ !X  TRX3'X3' Letter3'Letter3'LetterT    h  %    0  1($3|x ($X  TRX3'X3'3' Letter3' LetterT    3  %Brother HL-5170DN series,,,,0 64 憛4sU  &5,X  h d  , d (,%,%(  Ac')1dU E01AA')1qdU E%1A1  2 (x 3  4  h 5   6  X  7    8 H  9 p  10 8  11 ` 12 ( 13 P 14  15 @ 16  17 0  18 " 19  p$ 20  & 21 "`( 22 #* 23 %P , 24 x&!. 25 '@#0 26 h)$2 27 *0&4 28(35$ !X  TRX3'X3' Letter3'Avery 5164 Shipping Label3'LetterT    h  %   d (() Z(Times New Roman 2J+M 0_level1  X 2( ` hp x 223  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  2G+M 0_level2   /%` ` hp x /23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  2D+M 0_level3   ," hp x ,23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  2A+M 0_level4  ` ) hp x )23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  2>+M 0_level5   &hhp x &23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  2;+M 0_level6   #p x #23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  28+M 0_level7  h  p x 23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  25+M 0_level8   pp x 23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  22+M 0_level9    x 23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  2JM 0_levsl1  X 2( ` hp x 223  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  2GM 0_levsl2   /%` ` hp x /23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  2DM 0_levsl3   ," hp x ,23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  2AM 0_levsl4  ` ) hp x )23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  2>M 0_levsl5   &hhp x &23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  2;M 0_levsl6   #p x #23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  28M 0_levsl7  h  p x 23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  25M 0_levsl8   pp x 23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  22M 0_levsl9    x 23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  2JM 0_levnl1  X 2( ` hp x 223   5+ ` hp x 5  2GM 0_levnl2   /%` ` hp x /23   5+ ` hp x 5  2DM 0_levnl3   ," hp x ,23   5+ ` hp x 5  2AM 0_levnl4  ` ) hp x )23   5+ ` hp x 5  2>M 0_levnl5   &hhp x &23   5+ ` hp x 5  2;M 0_levnl6   #p x #23   5+ ` hp x 5  (() Z&Times New Roman28M 0_levnl7  h  p x 23   5+ ` hp x 5  25M 0_levnl8   pp x 23   5+ ` hp x 5  22M 0_levnl9    x 23   5+ ` hp x 5  0.Normal<:Definition T<AA:Definition L , 5+ ` hp x 5  5+ ` hp x 586Definition(''&H1      XXX(&H2  XXX(&H3  XXX(&H4 XXX XXX(&H5  XXX(&H6  XXX20Address8MM6Blockquote , , 5+ ` hp x 5   5+ ` hp x 5,*CITE,dl*CODEKg<6X9`(Courier NewKXXXSh\  `&Times New RomanS42Emphasis64Hyperlink    <:FollowedHype    4go2Keyboard Kg<6X9`(Courier NewK XXXSh\  `&Times New RomanS<:Preformatted/%  ,Kk %#/Kg<6X9`(Courier NewKXXXSh\  `&Times New RomanS/%  ,Kk %#/<:zBottom of 7[(X7  ?i%2A`Arial?7\(X7  XXXSh\  `&Times New RomanSc)1dxd'dxd<:zTop of For7^(X7  ?i%2A`Arial?7\(X7  XXXSh\  `&Times New RomanSc)2dxd0KS.SampleKg<6X9`(Courier NewKSh\  `&Times New RomanS0.Strong 8dl6TypewriterKg<6X9`(Courier NewKXXXSh\  `&Times New RomanS42Variable&0 d d: 8HTML MarkupB      2 0CommentB  (O$<6X9`(Courier New\  `&Times New Roman%2A`Arial  &,X  h d  , d (,%,%(  Ac')1dU E,01AA')1qdU E%,1A1  2 (x 3  4  h 5   6  X  7    8 H  9 p  10 8  11 ` 12 ( 13 P 14  15 @ 16  17 0  18 " 19  p$ 20  & 21 "`( 22 #* 23 %P , 24 x&!. 25 '@#0 26 h)$2 27 *0&4 28hill  !X  T@RX3'X3'3' Letter3' LetterT @ @ @ h @ o  _Ԁ  2  This misconductrequestisrequiredbytheCaliforniaSupremeCourt.hhԀ   Thus,generally,therequirementofanobjectiontoprosecutorialargumentis  statedin Peoplev.Green (1980)27Cal.3d1,24(failuretoobjecttoprosecution  argumentwaivestheissueunlessanobjectionwouldhavebeenfruitless.)And * thecourtshaveheldthatobjectingmaynotbeenough"Asageneralrulea < defendantmaynotcomplainonappealofprosecutorialmisconductunlessina N timelyfashionandonthesamegroundthedefendant[requested]anassignment  ` ofmisconductand[also]requestedthatthejurybeadmonishedtodisregardthe " r impropriety.[Citation.]"( Peoplev.Samayoa (1997)15Cal.4th795,841.)#hhߒ# Lampertt]imeDaggettKojayanCal.AppGodbeyRuckriegle A.L.EastlandTalkingtonref'dRaleyHearonWinshipScheckNeufeldDwyerNolasco HoptHauptPatzwalddefinitionalTraynorOsbandEngelman  !X  T@RX3'X3'3' Letter3' LetterT @ @ @ h @ o  _Ԁ  3  Thisrequestwouldincludethestatementtothejurybythecourt: hhLadiesand  Gentlemenofthejury,theprosecutorhasjustmadecertainuncalledfor  insinuationsaboutthedefendant.Iwantyoutoknowthattheprosecutorhas $ absolutelynoevidencetopresenttoyoutobackuptheseinsinuations.The 6 prosecutor'simproperremarksamounttoanattempttoprejudiceyouagainstthe H defendant.Wereyoutobelievetheseunwarrantedinsinuations,andconvictthe  Z defendantonthebasisofthem,Iwouldhavetodeclareamistrial.Therefore,you  l mustdisregardtheseimproper,unsupportedremarks." . ~ #hhߌ#*2+2 (_23 ` &<<DL&23  ..&<<DL& ` */+/ (_22  #DL#23  ..#DL#  *,+, (_21   DL 23  .. DL  *)+) (_20 h DDL23  ..DDL h *&+& (_19  L23  ..L  *#+# (_18   L23  .. L  *>> (_17  2( 4 <DL223  Ԁ2( 4 <DL2  *DD (_16   ," <DL,23  Ԁ," <DL,   *55 (_15  ) <DL)23  Ԁ) <DL)  *22 (_14 ` &<<DL&23  Ԁ&<<DL& ` *// (_13  #DL#23  Ԁ#DL#  *,, (_12   DL 23  Ԁ DL  *)) (_11 h DDL23  ԀDDL h *&& (_10  L23  ԀL  (## &_9   L23  Ԁ L  (>> &_8  2( 4 <DL223  2( 4 <DL2  (DD &_7   ," <DL,23  ," <DL,   (55 &_6  ) <DL)23  ) <DL)  (22 &_5 ` &<<DL&23  &<<DL& ` (// &_4  #DL#23  #DL#  (,, &_3   DL 23   DL  ()) &_2 h DDL23  DDL h (&& &_1  L23  L  &## $_   L23   L  (I Z6Times New Roman Regular    [$X  h  5   _Ԁhhh"ReconstructionofAutomobileDestruction:AnExampleoftheInteraction  BetweenLanguageandMemory"byE.LoftusandJ.Palmer,JournalofVerbal  LearningandVerbalBehavior13,585589(1974).#hhh߭#.\  `Times-Bold !X  TRX3'X3' Letter3'Letter3'LetterT    h  %  _  8XXdd8hhhOY@D hSUPERIORCOURTOFCALIFORNIA,COUNTYOFSANDIEGOhԈ   * ddd Xdd Xdd X%%,<dd ,<td +  8' $ $ x8hPEOPLEOFTHESTATEOF L  CALIFORNIA  X  ̀Plaintiffs,    v. <   THEACCUSED p  ̀Defendant. 2#8  2 CASENO:  L  POINTS&AUTHORITIES:   DEFENDANTSMOTIONSIN   _LIMINE_ԀTOGUARANTEEFAIR <  TRIAL3)' H  x   3*hh I.MOTIONTOPERMITSHORTHANDOBJECTIONTOFEDERALIZE ,| OBJECTIONSINSTEADOFLENGTHY,RECORDMAKINGONES. 8   ` Tomakeaproperconstitutionalobjection,thestateandfederalcourtshave ` requiredprecisionandspecificitybycounsel.Inotherwords,simplyobjecting (  hearsay,willnotpreserveaSixthAmendmentconfrontationissue,norwill P  objecting 352"or unfairtrialpreserveadueprocessissuewiththisexception. " #h*h}#hhhhIn Peoplev._Partida_ _(__2005)_Ԁ37Cal.4th428,thedefendantraisedandEvidence @$ Codesection352argumentthatthetrialcourtshouldhaveexcludedgang & evidence.Onappeal,hearguedtheerrorviolatedhisrighttodueprocess.The 0( CaliforniaSupremeCourtheldthathecouldraisethedueprocessargumentonly * onthefactualbasisarguedattrial(prejudiceoutweighedprobativevalue).No  !p, otherargumentthatdueprocessrequiredthetrialcourttoexcludetheevidence ". wouldbeheard.TheSupremeCourtheldthattheerrorinadmittingthegang $`0 evidencewasharmlessunderstatelawanddidnotrenderdefendant'strial % 2 fundamentallyunfairsoastodenydueprocess.#hh ##hh4 #*hhԀ 'P"4  ` In Duncanv.Henry (1995)513U.S.364,Mr.Henrywastriedina x(#6 Californiacourtforallegedmolestinga5yearoldchild.Theprosecutionwas )@%8 allowedtoputonevidenceoftheparentofanotherchildwhotestifiedthattwenty h+&: yearsprevious,Henrymolestedthatchild.Henryslawyerobjectedthatthe ,0(< _ evidenceshouldnotcomeinandcitedEvidenceCodesection352,arguingthe  evidencewasfarmoreundulyprejudicialthanrelevant.Theparenttestifiedand (x Henrywasconvicted.Ondirectappeal,hislawyersarguedthattheevidencewas  irrelevantandinflammatoryandthattheresultingerrorresultedinamiscarriageof  h justiceundertheCaliforniaConstitution(thestandardforwhetheranerroris   harmlessunderthestateconstitution).TheCourtofAppealfounderror,butruled  X  itharmless.Henrythenpetitionedinfederaldistrictcourt,arguingthattheerror    wasnotharmlessanddeniedhimfederaldueprocessoflaw.Thedistrictcourt H  grantedthepetition,andtheCourtofAppealfortheNinthCircuitaffirmedthe p  ruling. 8   ` TheU.S.SupremeCourtsummarilyreversedthegrantofreliefstatingthat ` Mr.Henryneverexplicitlyraisedthefederaldueprocessissueinstatecourtand ( thusdidnot"exhaust"hisclaim.Thecourtobservedthatthetestforthestatelaw P claimwassimilarto,butnotquitethesameasthefederaldueprocessclaim.By  notintoningthemagicwords dueprocessunderthefederalconstitution,the @ issuewaslostandMr.Henrysreversalofhisfelonyconvictionwentwithit.   ` AstheSupremeCourtstated,similarityofclaimsisnotenoughtoexhaust 0  anissueinstatecourttopermititsbeingraisedinfederalcourt.JusticeStevens " dissentplacedtheimpactofthisrulingmorebluntly:thecase tightensthe  p$ pleadingscrews...toholdthattheexhaustiondoctrineincludesanexactlabeling  & requirement.( Duncanv.Henry (1995)513U.S.364,368.) "`(  ` In #h*hK #hhhhIdahov.Wright (#hh߬#1990)497U.S.805,hh812,twocodefendantswere #* convictedofchildmolestationandeachappealed.One,Giles,appealedonlyon %P , statutoryhearsaygrounds.Thesecond,Wright,raisedhearsayandtherelated x&!. constitutionalConfrontationissue.TheIdahoSupremeCourtrejectedGiless '@#0 argumentandaffirmedhisconviction,butitagreedwithWrightonher h)$2 Confrontationclaimandreversedherconvictions.TherulingastoWrightwas *0&4 affirmedbytheU.S.SupremeCourt.NotfederalizinghisclaimcostGilesa X,'6 reversalofhisconviction.  #hhߍ##hh#*hh ` Ofcourse,thefederalrulesapplyequallytostatereview:noobjectionon (x appropriategrounds,noreviewonappealbecausetheissuehasnotbeen  preserved.( Peoplev.Clark (1993)5Cal.4th950,988n.13(Whenapartydoes  h notraiseanargumentattrial,hemaynotdosoonappeal);seealso Inre   Robbins (1998)18Cal.4th770; Peoplev.Gordon (1990)50Cal.3d1223,1254,  X  n.6(ahearsayobjectiondoesnotraiseafederalconfrontationquestionandthus    thefederalconstitutionalissuewaswaivedbycounselsincompetentlymade H  objection); Peoplev.Raley (1992)2Cal.4th870,892(defendantcontendedon p  appealthecourterredinadmittingevidenceandviolatedhisfederalconstitutional 8  rights,butbecausedefendantobjectedonlyonstatutorygroundsattrial,the ` constitutionalargumentsarenotcognizableonappeal.) (  ` Thisisnosmallpoint.Preciousconstitutionalrightscanbesacrificedfor P lackofafewsyllablesinstatinganobjection.See,e.g, #h*h)#hhhPetersonv.Lampert (9th  Cir.2003)#hhhw #hhhԀ319F.3d1153(petitionerdidnotfairlypresenthisfederalclaimto @ statesupremecourtbecauseonthefaceofhispetitionforreviewheexpressly  limitedhisclaimtostateconstitutionallaw,usedtheterm"inadequate"assistance 0  insteadof"ineffective"assistance,andcitedonlystatelawcases!federalpetition " dismissedasaresult.)  p$ #hhh #*hh ` Ifthereisanappealofthismatter,theStatewillurgethattrialcounsel  & waivedraisingaconstitutionalclaimandthusthedefendantmustbedeemed "`( procedurallybarredfromassertingit! [t]imeandagaininhisbriefs,he[the #* StateAttorneyGeneral]claimsthatacontentionbydefendantisprocedurally %P , barred.( Peoplev.Gordon (1990)50Cal.3d1223,1250.)  x&!.   ` Aremedy. Tosavethiscourtstimeduringthistrial,tonotfrustratethe '@#0 juryduringneedlessrecordmakingsidebarsforobjections,andtonotunduly h)$2 interruptopposingcounselspresentationofhisorhercase,presentcounsel *0&4 requestspermissiontouseabbreviatedterminologyinmakinghisconstitutional X,'6 objections.Thissamesimplifiedtechniqueiscommonlyusedtomakestandard  evidentiaryobjectionsundertheEvidenceCode.Thus,itiscommontoobjectby (x saying 352"inordertomakeanobjectiontoevidencewhichhassomerelevance  butwhichoutweighedbyitsprejudicialvalue.  h  ` Bythesametoken,thedefenserequeststomakehisconstitutional   objectionsinthefollowingmanner.  X   ` Option#1 :Thesimplestalternativewouldmakeeveryhearsay,relevance    or 352"objection deemedtohavebeenmade underthedueprocessclauseof H  the14thAmendments,andundertheconfrontationclauseofthe6thand14th p  amendments.(Thisrequiresagreementbythecourtontherecord.) 8    ` Option#2: Ifoption#1isrejected,thena bythenumbersalternativeis ` proposed:Any5thAmendmentdueprocessobjectionwouldbemadebysimply ( byadding 5"totheevidentiaryobjection.SixthAmendmentconfrontationor P righttopresentevidenceissueswouldbemadebyadding 6"tosuchclaim  protectedbythe6thAmendment.Whenobjectingtounconstitutionalargument @ bytheprosecutortothejury,counselwouldobjectbysaying prosecutionerror.      1      ׀   Thistoorequiresagreementbythecourtontherecord.#h*h"#*hhԀThespecificsof 0  incorporatedmeaningofeitheroption#1or#2areasfollows: "  + . `  5"=sFIFTHAMENDMENTDUEPROCESS   p$ 0 ` ThisobjectionencompassestheFifthAmendmentoftheU.S.Constitution  & dueprocessguaranteeofafairtrialasmadeavailabletotheStatesthrough !( the14thAmendment. Franklinv.Duncan, 70F.3d75(9thCir.1995), "* adopting,884F.Supp.1435,1456(N.D.Cal1995)(denialofintroductionof #6, defenseevidencetoimpeachcomplainingwitnessdenieddueprocessfair %P . trial.).&j!0` %` %  . +00 ` 6"=sSIXTHAMENDMENTCONFRONTATION &RIGHTTO N(#4 PRESENTEVIDENCEINDEFENSEOFTHEACCUSED ` %` %  0 ` Thisobjectionstatesthatthedefendantsstateandfederalconstitutional (x rightstoconfrontwitnessesagainsthimasguaranteedbytheSixthand B FourteenthAmendmentstotheUnitedStatesConstitution,andunderthe \ similar,butseparateandindependentCaliforniaConstitutionalprotections v  providedbyarticleone,sectionssevenandfifteen areviolated. U.S.v.    Kojayan, 8F.3d1315,1321(9thCir.1993)(prosecutionviolatesthe    "advocatewitness"rulebyasserting factsnotinevidence); U.S.v.   Prantil, 756F.2d759,764(9thCir.1985)(unfairlyimpugningdefense  .  counseldeniesdueprocess.);accordSee U.S.v.Rodrigues, 159F.3d439, H  451(9thCir.1998).b ` %` % 1 +50 ` 8"=sEIGHTHAMENDMENTPROTECTIONAGAINSTCRUEL F  ORUNUSUALPUNISHMENT &THESTATECONSTITUTIONAL  PROTECTIONAGAINSTCRUELANDUNUSUALPUNISHMENT.6` %` %  0 ` Ifthedefendantmovesunder Romero tostrikestrikes,heisalsoraisingthe  issueasacruelorunusualconstitutionalclaim.&v ` %` %  + PROSECUTIONERRORMEANSTHEFOLLOWING:  " 8 ` Thisobjectionincludesthestatementthattheprosecutorscomment f$ isirrelevant,inflammatory,andprejudicial.Theobjectionis 0& groundedinthedefendantsstateandfederaldueprocessrightstoa J( fairtrialundertheFifthandFourteenthAmendmentstotheUnited d* StatesConstitution,aswellasmyclientsstateandfederal ~, constitutionalrighttoconfrontwitnessesagainsthimasguaranteed  . bytheSixthandFourteenthAmendmentstotheUnitedStates !0 Constitution,andunderthesimilar,butseparateandindependent "2 CaliforniaConstitutionalprotectionsprovidedbyarticleone,sections #64 sevenandfifteen.Theerrorhas"soinfectedthetrialwithunfairness %P 6 astomaketheresultingconvictionadenialofdueprocess." &j!8 ( Donnellyv.DeChristoforo (1974)416U.S.637,643.)Ialsoaskthe 4'": courttoassignthisasmisconduct,q    2      ׀striketheoffendingcomments, N(#< andadmonishthejurytodisregarditper Peoplev.Bolton (1979)23  Cal.3d208,21516,n.5 . s>     3      ׀Ifthecourtwillnotdothat,Iaskfora  mistrialgiventheextremelyprejudicialnatureofthestatementson 4 myclientsfairtrialrights. (Bergerv.U.S. (1935)295U.S.78.)#h*h߀-#*hhN` (#` (# #h*h߭># II.COMPLAININGWITNESSESANDTHEDEFENDANTSHOULDBE 2   ADDRESSEDBYTHEIRNAMESANDNOTBYCONCLUSORYAND  >  ARGUMENTATIVELABELSWHICHASSUMEFACTSNOTIN    EVIDENCEANDUNDERMINETHEPRESUMPTIONOFINNOCENCE.  f    ` Thequestionatthistrialiswhetherthecomplainingwitnesseswere  .  "victims"(theprosecutiontheory),orlyingand/ormistaken(thedefensetheory). V  Neithertheprosecutor,courtpersonnel,northeStateswitnessesshouldbe   allowedtocharacterizeanycomplainingwitnesses    4      ׀duringthetrial(exceptinfinal F  argument)as"thevictim"or victims,anymorethanthedefenseshouldcalled  thedefendantthroughoutthetrailas theframedvictim.Thisprohibitionwould (x includevoirdire,openingstatement(whichisnottobeargumentative),andtrial  testimony.  h  ` Commonsensedictatesthatatleastuntilthejurydecidesthecase,the   complainingwitnessremainsanallegedvictim,andnot"thevictim."The  X  "victim"characterizationisargumentativeandsubvertsthedefendants    presumptionofinnocencebytheStatesrepeatedcharacterizingforthejurythe H  complainingwitnesssversionasthecorrectone.Thetermisstatutorilydefined p  as*hhԀoneagainstwhomacrimehasbeencommitted.(PenalCode679.01(b).)#h*hߝE# 8  Assuch,tosolabelthecomplainingwitnessthroughoutthetrialviolatesthe ` defendantsstateandfederalrightunderdueprocess(asdescribedabove)tohis ( presumptionofinnocenceasprotectedbythedueprocessclauseofthe5thand P 14thAmendmentstotheU.S.Constitution.ItalsoviolatesthedefendantsSixth  Amendmentand14thAmendmentrighttoajurydeterminationofthefacts,as @ wellastheanalogprotectionprovidedbytheCaliforniaConstitution.   ` hhDescriptivewordsmakeadifferenceinperceptions.Inastudydoneover 0  thirtyyearsago,    5      ׀#hhߦH#hhhexperimentersreportedthataftersubjectsviewedfilmsofauto " accidentsandansweredquestionsabouttheirexperience,themerephrasingof  p$ questionschangedestimatesofthecarsspeed.Thequestion, Abouthowfast  & werethecarsgoingwhentheysmashedintoeachother?elicitedhigherspeed  estimatesthanwhenlesssuggestivetermswereused(e.g., collided, bumped, (x  contacted,or hit.)Also,whenaskedaweeklateraboutwhattheysaw,  subjectswhoreceivedtheverb smashedweremorelikelytosay yestothe  h question, Didyouseeanybrokenglass?,eventhoughnobrokenglasswasinthe   film. `   X   ` Thestudypresentsanempiricalbasiswhywitnessesandtheprosecutor    mustbeprecludedfromadorningtheirtestimonyorargumentwithargumentative, H  suggestiveandbiasedstatements.Suchstatementsbiasthejurythroughnonetoo p  subtleprogramming.#hhhߪI# 8   ` Further,prosecutorialstatementsareassumedtomakeanimpressionupon ` themindsofthejurorsbecausetheoffice"carriessuchweightwithajurythathis ( statementoffactpredicatedonhisknowledge,ratherthanontheevidence, P constitutereversibleerror."( Peoplev.Purvis (1963)60Cal.2d323,341[33  Cal.Rptr.104].)Generally,alawyercannotusesubterfugetoplacebeforeajury @ matterswhichitcannotproperlyconsider.( Peoplev.Daggett (1990)225  Cal.App.3d751,759[275Cal.Rptr.287].)And,aprosecutorcannotuseargument 0  orquestioningasabasisto testifybeforethejury. (Peoplev.Hill (1998)17 " Cal.4th800,82728  Ԁ[72Cal.Rptr.2d656] .)"Whenalawyerassertsthatsomething  p$ notintherecordistrue,heis,ineffect,testifying.Heistellingthejury:`Look,I  & knowalotmoreaboutthiscasethanyou,sobelievemewhenItellyouXisa "`( fact.Thisisdefinitelyimproper."( UnitedStatesv.Kojayan (9thCir.1993)8 #* F.3d1315,1321.) %P ,  ` In Peoplev.Sanchez (1989)208Cal.App.3d721,739-740,thecourt x&!. rejectedanappealclaimofconstitutionallyineffectiveassistanceofcounselfor '@#0 failuretoassertthispositionattrialbuthiswasbecausetherewerefewer h)$2 mentionsofthetermbytheprosecutorthandefense,andbecauseitwaslargely *0&4 restrictedtocommentsinvoirdire.However,eventhoughtheissuewasnot X,'6 raisedproperlyonappeal,thecourtfoundthattheusebytheprosecutorwas  "possiblyobjectionable,"butthattherewasnoprejudiceonthefactsofthecase. (x Seealso Godbeyv.Oklahoma (1987)731P.2d986("Inthefifthinstancethe  prosecutorreferredtothecomplainingwitnessasavictim.Duringhisobjection,  h defensecounselassertedthatthewitnessshouldbereferredtoas"allegedvictim,"   whichthetrialcourtsustained.")  X  *hh ` Thecourtfollowingcasessupportprohibitingtheuseoftheargumentative    term victim:#h*hX#<( 4 <DLX<hhh Jacksonv.State ,600A.2d21,24(Del.1991)("Weagreewith H  defendantthattheword"victim"shouldnotbeusedinacasewherethe p  commissionofacrimeisindispute");#hhhY#<( 4 <DLX<hhh Allenv.State ,644A.2d982,983n.1(Del. 8  1994)("when,ashere,consentisthesoledefenseinarapecase,theuseofthe ` term"victim"byaprosecutorattrialisimproperandtobeavoided");#hhhmZ# <( 4 <DLX<hhhVetetov. ( State, 8S.W.3d805,816817(Tex.App.2000)("ReferringtoA.L.asthevictim P insteadoftheallegedvictimlendscredencetohertestimonythattheassaults  occurredandthatshewas,indeed,avictim.Thissituationissimilartoacase @ whereconsentisthesoleissueinarapetrial.TheEastlandCourtofAppealshas  heldinarapecaseinvolvingconsentthatareferencetothecomplainantasa 0  victiminthechargetothejuryimpliedthatthesexualencounterwasnot " consentedtoandwasthusanimpropercommentontheweightoftheevidenceby  p$ thecourt. Talkingtonv.State ,682S.W.2d674,675(Tex.App.Eastland1984,  & pet.ref'd).Thus,thetrialcourtalsocommentedontheweightoftheevidenceby "`( failingtorefertoA.L.asthe"alleged"victim");#hhh[#<( 4 <DLX<hhh Statev.Wright, 2003Ohio #* 3511,P6(OhioCt.App.,2003)("wearecompelledtonotethatthetrialcourt %P , shouldrefrainfromusingtheterm"victim,"asitsuggestsabiasagainstthe x&!. defendantbeforetheStatehasprovena"victim"trulyexists.")#hhh?`# '@#0  ` Theprecedentiscompellinglyreasonedandshowedbefollowedinthis h)$2 case. ` Witnessesinthiscaseshouldbeaddressedbytheirpropergivennames.It *0&4 thatisunsatisfactoryforsomereason,thenthenonargumentativeterm X,'6  complainingwitnessshouldbeused.   III.ITISMISCONDUCTFORTHEPROSECUTIONTOTELLTHE  JURYITREPRESENTSTHE PEOPLEINAMANNERTHATIMPLIES \ THATHE/SHEREPRESENTSTHEJURORSAGAINSTTHE  h DEFENDANT.  $ Ic 󀀀Theprosecutormay,assomedo,maintainthatitiscorrecttotellthejurythat  X  he/sherepresentsthepeopleofthestateofCalifornia,andthat Iamanadvocate    forthem."Thisstatementimproperlysuggeststothejurorswhoaresupposed H  tobeimpartialfactfindersthattheyareinfactalignedwiththeprosecutor p  againstthedefendant.     6      ׀ 8   ` Itis,ofcourse,misconducttosuggestsuchanotion.AstheSupremeCourt ` statedin Peoplev.Eubanks (1996)14Cal.4th580,589590),theroleandinterest ( oftheprosecutioninacriminalcaseisobviouslynotthatofthejuryandthe P phrase thePeopleincludesthedefendant:  8 ` Thenatureoftheimpartialityrequiredofthepublicprosecutor @ followsfromtheprosecutor'sroleasrepresentativeofthePeopleasa ^ body,ratherthanasindividuals. "Theprosecutorspeaksnotsolely , forthevictim,orthepolice,orthosewhosupportthem,butfor  allthePeople.Thatbodyof'ThePeople'includesthedefendant x  andhisfamilyandthosewhocareabouthim. Italsoincludesthe F! vastmajorityofcitizenswhoknownothingaboutaparticularcase, d" butwhogiveovertotheprosecutortheauthoritytoseekajustresult 2# intheirname."(Corrigan,OnProsecutorialEthics(1986)13Hastings $ Const.L.Q.537,538539.)Thusthedistrictattorneyisexpectedto ~ % exercisehisorherdiscretionaryfunctionsintheinterestsofthe L!& Peopleatlarge,andnotundertheinfluenceorcontrolofaninterested "j' individual.( Peoplev.SuperiorCourt(Greer) ,supra,19Cal.3dat "8( p.267.)[Emphasisadded.]#)` (#` (# !h@ m ` Unliketheadversaryroleoftheprosecutor,thedomainofthejudgeandthe @% + juryistruedisinterestandobjectivityinacriminalcase.( Id. at590.)Tosuggest  tojurorsthattheprosecutorsroleandinterestandthejurysroleandinterestare (x oneandthesameisatotaldistortionoftheconstitutionalroleeachmustplayand  underminesthedefendantsFifthAmendmentrighttodueprocessoflaw,the  h presumptionofinnocence,proofbeyondareasonabledoubt,andtheSixth   Amendmentrighttotrialbeforeanimpartialjury.  X        IV.MEMORANDUMOFPOINTSANDAUTHORITIESINSUPPORTOF  ADDINGTHENECESSARYLEVELOFCERTITUDETOTHE l REASONABLEDOUBTINSTRUCTIONBYDEFINING ABIDING (x CONVICTIONANDPREVENTUNDERMININGDEFENDANTSDUE 4 PROCESSANDSIXTHAMENDMENTRIGHTTOAJURYDECISION  BASEDUPONSUFFICIENTEVIDENCEOFEVIDENTIARY \ CERTAINTY.   h  ` CALJIC2.90reads:   8 ` Adefendantinacriminalactionispresumedtobeinnocentuntilthe  X  contraryisproved,andincaseofareasonabledoubtwhetherhisguilt    is satisfactorilyshown, heisentitledtoaverdictofnotguilty.This    presumptionplacesuponthePeopletheburdenofprovinghimguilty <  beyondareasonabledoubt.Reasonabledoubtisdefinedasfollows: It H  isnotamerepossibledoubtbecause everythingrelatingto   humanaffairsisopentosomepossibleorimaginarydoubt.  p  Rather,itisthatstateofthecasewhichaftertheentirecomparison ,|  andconsiderationofalltheevidenceleavesthemindsofjurorsinthat 8  conditionthattheycannotsaytheyfeelan abidingconviction ofthe   truthofthecharge.(emphasisadded.)`` (#` (#  ` ThenewCALCRIMinstructiondoesnotdiffermaterially.SeeNumber103 ( whichdefinesreasonabledoubtas:<( 4 <DLX< hhX| Xh  Proofbeyondareasonabledoubtisproofthatleaves P youwithan#h XX|>w#X| Xhabidingconvictionthatthechargeistrue#h XX|w#:h#::w#::.  #::x##h:Hx# ` Theinstructionsmustbesupplementedwithadefinitionof abiding @ convictiontoaddthefollowingwordstothelastsentence: thattheycannotsay  theyfeelanabidingconvictionofthetruthofthecharge.[ Add: ]Abiding 0  convictionmeansconvincingyoutoanearcertaintyofthetruthofthecharge. "  ` Further,thejuryshouldnotbeadmonishedthatadoubtisnotreasonableif  p$ itis"merelypossible."Suchaninstructionunconstitutionallytellsjurorstoreject  & apossibledoubtasunreasonable.Yet,apossibledoubtarisingfromtheevidence "`( canbeareasonableone. *hh #*  ` #h*h |#*hh"Jurorsarenotexpertsinlegalprinciples;tofunctioneffectively,andjustly, %P , theymustbeaccuratelyinstructedinthelaw."( Carterv.Kentucky (1981)450 x&!. U.S.288,302.)Instructionalguidancehereiscriticaltoinsurethatthejurydoes '@#0 notconvictbecauseofitsowninterpretationof abidingconvictionthatfalls h)$2 shortoftheveryhighdegreeofprobabilityconstitutionallyrequired.Thesetwo *0&4 wordsofthecurrentinstructionhavetoconveytheentireweightofthe X,'6 constitutionalburdenofproofbeyondareasonabledoubt.Theyfailinthat  endeavorand,ataminimum,thecourtmustprovideadefinitionoftheterms (x  abidingconvictionthatinsuresthatthejuryisnotmisledintodilutingthe  Statesburdenofproofbeyondareasonabledoubt.  h  ` Thus,thismotionmayalternativelybedeemedarequesttodefine abiding   convictionbyprovidingan#h*hs|#*hhadditionalsentencetotheCALJIC2.90instruction  X  thatreads: Thephrase`abidingconvictionmeans,inthecontextoftheentire    instruction,thatstateofthecasewhichaftertheentirecomparisonand H  considerationofalltheevidenceleavesthemindsofjurorsinthatconditionthat p  theycannotsaytheyfindthecharge(s)tobetruebecause#h*h##*hhtheyarenotproventoan 8  evidentiarycertainty.Inotherwords,youmusthaveastateofmindofnear ` certaintyinthetruthofcharges. (  ` JusticeMoskcriticizedthe abidingconvictionphraseinhisconcurring P opinionin Peoplev.Brigham (1979)25Cal.3d283,299.Heasked, whatisan  `abidingconviction? [I]thaslongsincefallenintodisuseandisnolongerpart @ ofourdailyspeech,andconnoteonlythe durationofthejurysbelief.( Ibid .)  JusticeMoskrightlystatedthat thedurationofajurorsbeliefinguiltyis 0  essentiallyirrelevant.( Id. at300.)Addingtheword convictionisnotonlyof " nohelp;itaddstotheconfusionbecausethatwordhasameaningofan  p$ adjudicationofguilt.( Id. at300,n.5.)Clearly,thisisaphraseinneedof  & definition.#h*h#*hh "`(  ` Instructionsprovidingdefinitionsarerequiredforwordsorphrasesthatmay #* bebeyondthejurorsknowledge.Thisphraseiscertainlyoneofthem.#h*h߮#h     7      #h#*hhԀAn %P , alternatedefinitionsuggestedbyFORECITE[2.90e]is:  Cv8 ` #h*hR#ԀAnabidingconvictionbasedonproofbeyondareasonabledoubt (x isthehighestlevelofcertaintyrecognizedinthelaw.Itrequiresa 4 greaterdegreeofcertaintythanthenextlowerstandardof"clearand  convincingevidence."Clearandconvincingevidencerequiresa \ findingofhighprobability.Theevidencemustbesoclearastoleave  h nosubstantialdoubt.Itmustbesufficientlystrongtocommandthe  $ unhesitatingassentofeveryreasonablemind.Again,theproof   beyondareasonabledoubtstandardrequiresagreaterdegreeof L   certaintythanthatrequiredtomeettheclearandconvincingevidence  X  standard.  ` (#` (#  ` Tobesure,appellatecourtsseenothingerroneous,vagueormisleading <  aboutCALJIC2.90initscurrentformeitherwhenviewedinisolationorwithall   instructionsgiven.Indeed,onecourthasstatedavariantofthisissueshouldbe ,|  takenoffthemenusofappellatecounsel.( Peoplev.Hearon (1999)72Cal.App.   4th1285,1287(summarizingtherejectionsofitintheCourtsofAppeal.)See l alsohhhԀ Peoplev.Light (1996)44Cal.App.879,888898(upholding"abiding  conviction"#hhhz#*hhtermagainstchallenge.)  \  ` Yet,thedefectinCALJIC2.90existsanditisclearthattheconceptof  reasonabledoubt(theveryhighdegreeofprobabilityrequiredundertheU.S.  Constitutiontosustainaconviction)hasbeendilutedbelowconstitutional (x minimums,especiallywhenalltheprobabilitybasedCALJICinstructionsare  added.Astandardofproofisaneffortatinstructingthejuryonthedegreeof  h confidenceoursocietythinksitshouldhaveinthecorrectnessofitsfactual   conclusions.( Jacksonv.Virginia (1979)443U.S.307,332.)See Sullivanv.  X  Louisiana ,508U.S.275,277(1993)("ItwouldnotsatisfytheSixthAmendment    tohaveajurydeterminethatthedefendantisprobablyguilty,andthenleaveitup H  tothejudgetodetermine(as Winship requires)whetherheisguiltybeyonda p  reasonabledoubt.")#h*h'#*hhWiththerevelationofwrongfulconvictionsinserious 8  criminalcases(SeeScheck,Neufeld,andDwyer, ActualInnocence (Signet ` 2001)),thesinglemostimportantbulwarkagainstthatphenomenaisthe ( reasonabledoubtstandard.#h*h߮#hhh InreWinship, 397U.S.358,363(1970)("Itisa P primeinstrumentforreducingtheriskofconvictionsrestingonfactualerror.")   ` #hhh$#*hhThereisnobetterwaytobringaboutfalseconvictionsthantotelljuries @ theycanconvictbaseduponmerefeelingsoflastingbeliefinguiltrestingon   satisfactorilyshownevidence.TheseconceptsgutthemeaningoftheStates 0  burdenofproofwhichistoproveitscasetoaveryhighprobability,describedby " thisCourtas evidentiarycertaintyorasubjectivestateinthemindsofthejurors  p$ ofnearcertainty.(See Peoplev.Johnson (2004)119Cal.App.4th976  & (reversibletotelljurorsreasonabledoubtmeansthesameasan everyday "`( decision.) #*  ` Therighttoaproperinstructionontheburden %P , 8 ` ...beyondareasonabledoubtis"indispensable,forit'impresseson x&!. thetrieroffactthenecessityofreachingasubjectivestateofcertitude 4'"/ ofthefactsinissue.'" InreWinship ,397U.S.358,364,90S.Ct. '@#0 1068,25L.Ed.2d368(1970).Thereasonabledoubtstandardgives (#1 substancetothepresumptionofinnocenceandinstillsconfidencein h)$2 thecommunitythattheinnocentwillnotbecondemned. Id. at $*t%3 363-64.Adefendantinacriminalcasethereforehasaconstitutional *0&4 righttohavethejuryinstructedthatguiltmustbeestablishedbeyond +&5 areasonabledoubt.[Citation]. UnitedStatesv.Nolasco ,926F.2d X,'6 869,871(9thCir.enbanc1990).#h*h)#*hh` (#` (#  ` Whentheconceptof moralcertaintywascriticizedbytheU.S.Supreme (x Courtasmisleading,thecourtstatedthatwhatreasonabledoubtmeantwas   evidentiarycertainty. Thatforcefulconceptstandsasthebulwarkagainstthe  h manyCALJICinstructionsemphasizingpreponderanceofevidencestandards!   e.g.,juryshouldnotbelievethedefendanttobemorelikelyguiltythannotguilty  X  basedsolelyonhisarrest,chargeandstandingtrial(CALJIC1.00);ifone    interpretationoftheevidenceisreasonableandanotherunreasonable,thejury H  mustacceptthereasonable(CALJIC2.01);jurymayrejectawitnessstestimony p  iffalseinpartunlessitfindstheprobabilityoftruthfavorsthewitnesssversion. 8  (CALJIC2.21.2.)Also,prosecutorsintheirclosingargumenttypicallyarguefor ` guiltasthe onlyreasonableverdict. (  ` Cagev.Louisiana (1990)498U.S.39,    8      ׀involvedanunconstitutionally P vaguereasonabledoubtdefinitionfocusingjurorattentiononmoralbeliefsrather  thanwhethertheobjectiveevidenceofferedwassufficient.TheUnitedStates @ SupremeCourthelditunconstitutionalbecauseitdefinedreasonabledoubtas  "foundeduponarealtangiblesubstantialbasisandnotuponmerecapriceand 0  conjecture."( Id., at498U.S.40.)Concludingthatthechallengedinstruction " equatedareasonabledoubtwitha"graveuncertainty,"thehighcourtconcluded  p$ thatthismighthavealteredtheconstitutionalstandardforpenalliabilitytooneof  & "amoralcertainty"thatthedefendantwasguilty"( ibid );thehighcourtreversed "`( theconvictionduetothisbasicstructuraldefect. #*  ` Victorv.Nebraska (1994)511U.S.1,upheldaconvictionwherethe %P ,  moralcertaintyversionofCALJIC2.90waschallenged.TheCourtdidnot x&!. "countenanceitsuse" (id. at12,22),recognizingthat"ajurymightunderstandthe '@#0 phrasetomeansomethinglessthantheveryhighlevelofprobabilityrequiredby  theConstitutionincriminalcases." (Id. at14.)TheCourtheld,however,thatthe (x instructionwasbuttressedbythephrase"abidingconviction"sothatthejury  wouldknowoftherequiredhighlevelofprobabilityamountingtothat"subjective  h stateof nearcertitude oftheguiltoftheaccused." (Id. at15;emphasisadded.)     9          ` WheretheCaliforniacourtshaveerredisininterpretinglanguagein Victor#h*h=#*hh ,  X  andviewingitasapprovinganinstructionwhichdefinesreasonabledoubtonlyin    termsofanabidingconviction.( Victor, at1415.)Inanoverreactiontothe H  decision,theCaliforniaLegislature,actingatthesuggestionoftheCalifornia p  SupremeCourt( Peoplev.Freeman #h*hK#*hh(1994)#h*h #*hhԀ8Cal.4th450,504,fn.9#h*hT#*hh),#h*h߰#*hhԀeliminated 8  theprobabilitystandardfromthereasonabledoubtdefinition(formerly abiding ` convictiontoamoralcertainty)bystriking moralcertaintyandnotreplacingit ( withanyprobabilitystandard.#h*h#*hh P  ` Inthiscriticalpassageof Victor, theCourtcited Hoptv.Utah (1886)120  U.S.430,whichhadruledapprovinglyofthelanguageofan abidingconviction, @ butoninthecontextoftheinstructiongiventhere.Thelanguageofthe  instructionin Hopt wastetheredtoalevelofahighprobabilityconcept;inother 0  words,theinstructionthererequiredthelastingbelief(abidingconviction)ina " decisioninvolvingajurorsownimportantaffairs.Thus,thecourtsaidin Hopt   p$  itisdifficulttoconceivewhatamountofconvictionwouldleavethemindofa  & jurorfreefromareasonabledoubt,ifitbenotonewhichissosettledandfixedas "`( tocontrolhisactioninthemoreweightyandimportantmattersrelatingtohisown #* affairs.( Id .at339.)Thisisbecause [i]ftheevidenceproducedbeofsucha %P , convincingcharacterthattheywouldunhesitatinglybegovernedbyitinsuch x&!. weightyandimportantmatters,theymaybesaidtohavenoreasonabledoubt....  ( Id. at441.) (x  ` Indeed, Hopt referredtoanEnglishcaseasequivalenttotheoneapproved  inHauptscase.Ittoldthejurytohavethat levelofcertaintywithwhichyou  h shouldtransactyourownmostimportantconcernsinlife.( Id. at441.) Hopt    recognizedandapprovedof abidingconvictionlanguagebecauseitwastiedtoa  X  levelofcertainty.Anynotionthat Victor or Hopt heldthatamere abiding    convictiondefinitionofreasonabledoubtwouldbeconstitutionalisdestroyed H  uponexaminationofthecases.Othercourtshaveheldsuchinstructionsrelyonly p  onan abidingconvictionunconstitutional.(See Patzwaldv.U.S. (1898)54P. 8  458,459460[7Okla.232]; Williamsv.State (1896)73Miss.820[18So.826].) `  ` Further,asnotedinfootnote8supra,justasthe Victor courtbelievedthe ( term moralcertaintymeantsomethingdifferent(lessdemanding)in P contemporarytimesthanitdidin1850,thesamemaybesaidofan abiding  conviction.    10      ׀Today,thebestalinguistwouldopineisthatthetermmeans @ nothingmorethanalastingbelief.Butinwhat?Mattersfoundtruebya  preponderanceofevidence,orclearandconvincingevidencecouldsustaina 0  lastingbelief,butclearlywouldbeunconstitutionaliftheywereappliedina " criminalcase.  p$  ` Thecentralpointof Victor isthatthe abidingconvictionused in  & conjunctionwith the moralcertaintyclause(ahighprobability)savedthe  constitutionalityoftheinstruction:#h*hV#hhhԀ (x 8 ` 8 ` (#` (# wearesatisfiedthatthereferencetomoralcertainty,in  conjunctionwiththeabidingconvictionlanguage, \ "impresseduponthefactfindertheneedtoreacha  h subjectivestateofnearcertitudeoftheguiltofthe  $ accused."#hhh#*hhԀ[Citation].511U.S.15.#h*hɾ#*hh    :#h*h%#*hh    ` Thecurrentinstructionissovagueandlowprobabilityorientedthatjurors  X  wouldinterpretitasrequiringonlyapreponderanceofevidencetoconvict.In    fact,intheSeptember/October1999magazine, TheSciences (p.18),asurveyof H  midlevelbusinessexecutiveswasdonetoseewhatlevelofprobabilitythey p  interpretedCaliforniasreasonabledoubtinstructionrequired.Thefigureswere 8  alarming: `  `    35%puttheprobabilityatover90% (  `    35%puttheprobabilityat8090%   `    18%puttheprobabilityat7080% P  `    12%puttheprobabilityat5070%   x    \  `  ` Inotherwords,therewaswiderangingdisagreementandonethirdofthis L  relativelysophisticatedandhomogeneouspopulationofbusinesspeople( id. at t 20)thoughtthatprobabilitiesrangingfor50%to80%weregoodenoughto <! convict.Fromreadingthearticle,thisinstructiondidnotincludethe satisfactory d# proofclausewhichonlyfurtherinsuresalowprobabilityconceptis ,% communicated.ThisisbecauseCALJIC2.90'sdefinitionalcoreofreasonable T!' doubtisnotjustanabidingconviction.Itreducesthelevelofproofofguilttothat ") whichis satisfactorilyshowninotherwords, satisfactoryproofsupporting D$+ alastingbelief.    11      ׀Preponderanceoftheevidenceandclearandconvincing % !- evidencecangeneratelastingbeliefs,butthesereducedcivilcertaintystandards  areobviouslyunconstitutionalifusedinacriminalcase. (x  ` Coupledwiththeother reasonablenessCALJICinstructionsroutinely  giventhejury,theoverallresulttrivializesthereasonabledoubtstandardsothata  h juryhasnoclueoftherequiredhighlevelof"nearcertainty"( Peoplev.Hall    (1964)62Cal.2d104,112(opinionbyChiefJusticeTraynor),or"evidentiary  X  certainty"( Cagev.Louisiana, supra,at489U.S.41),ora"subjectivestateof     nearcertitude oftheguiltoftheaccused" (Victor supraat15)#h*hߕ#hhh,or utmost H  certainty( InreWinship (1970)397U.S.358,364#hhh#*hh.) p   ` Withoutsomelevelofnearcertitudeintheinstructiontogivethelasting  belief(abidingconviction)languagemeaningtheresultingcombinationdeflates (x therequiredcertaintytoconvictanddeniesdueprocessoflaw.(Butsee People  v.Osband (1996)13Cal.4th622,statingtheseinstructionsdonotconfusethe  h juryontheproperstandard;compare Peoplev.Nguyen (1995)40Cal.App.4th   28(improperargumentforprosecutortotrivializereasonabledoubtstandardwith  X  examplesofeverydaydecisionspeoplemake).)Whileappellateattacksto    overturnconvictionsbasedupontheomissionofacertaintystandardhavefailed H  inthisstate,see,e.g., Peoplev.Hearon, supra,theissueremainsbecausea p  conceptofevidentiarycertaintyisrequiredtobegiventhejuryandthe 8  instructionshere,assessedintheirentirety,donotcomeclosetoaccurately ` demandingthatlevelofcertitude.( Victorv.Nebraska, supraat5(takenasa ( whole,theinstructionsmustcorrectlyconveytheconceptofreasonabledoubt.) P  ` Thisisstructuralerrorandwillwarrantreversalperseunder Cage ifa  convictionresults. ( Sullivanv.Louisiana( 1993)508U.S.275.)Thiscourt @ certainlyhasthepower(andduty)toimplementtheU.S.Constitutionsguarantee  thatnopersonisconvictedonlessevidencethanthatrequiredbydueprocessof 0  lawandtheSixthAmendmentrighttotrialbyjuryunderthatstandard..Appellate " decisionswhichrefusetoreverseconvictionsdonotforbidthiscourtfrom  p$ implementingtherequiredlanguageoftheU.S.SupremeCourtin Cage and  &  Victor byaddingthefewwordstotheinstructiontocommunicatethe "`( constitutionallevelofproof. #*  ` Nothingforbidsit.PenalCode1096,asamendedin1995,restatesthe %P , CALJIC2.90instruction,but1096aalsostatesonlythat ...nofurtherinstruction x&!. onthesubjectofthepresumptionofinnocenceorthedefinitionofreasonable '@#0 doubt needbegiven. (Emphasisadded.)Thatstatutorylanguageobviouslydoes h)$2 notmandatethatnoadditionalwords canbegiven. 󀀀Giventhatthisisthemost *0&4 fundamentalofconstitutionalguaranteesandthattheCALJICPenalCode1096 X,'6 defectcanberemediedbysimplyaddingafewwordstothecurrentdefective  instruction,itmustbedone.Specifically,theinstructionwouldjustaddthewords (x "toanevidentiarycertainty"tothecurrent2.90followingthewords,"abiding  conviction",soitwouldread,"abidingconvictiontoanevidentiarycertaintyinthe  h truthofthecharge."    ` Thedefensehascommissioneda50statesurveyofjuryinstructionson  X  reasonabledoubt.Thesurveyofstaterulesshowsthefollowing:SeveralStates    continuetohavetheprooftoa moralcertaintylanguageintheirdefinitions H  (Alabama,Idaho,Minnesota,Tennessee).ApluralityofStatesuseavariantof p  the Hoptv.Utah definition!proofsuchthatajurorwouldnothesitatetoactin 8  theirownimportantaffairs(Alaska,Arkansas,Colorado,Conn.,D.C.,Maryland, ` Montana,Nebraska,Nevada,NewHampshire,NewMexico,NewYork,Ohio, ( Pennsylvania,SouthCarolina,SouthDakota,WestVirginia,Wisconsin). P  ` OtherStatesemploydefinitionswitharequirementofsomeformofhigh  probability(Arizona,Hawaii,Virginia),or firmlyconvinced(Delaware, @ Louisiana,Missouri,RhodeIsland), firmandabiding(NorthDakota), fulland  abiding(Iowa), reasonablecertainty(Georgia),that almostcertain(Maine), 0   nearcertainty(Massachusetts),or #h*hߔ#*hhmorepowerfulthanmorelikelytruethannot " true.#h*h#*hh(NewJer#h*h߅#*hhsey,Indiana), fullysatisfiesorentirelyconvincesyouofthe  p$ defendantsguilt(No#h*h#*hhrthCarolina),#h*h߆#*hhԀ proofwhichsatisfiesthemind,convincesthe  & understandingofthosewhoareboundtoact.(Utah) "`(  ` OtherStatesdictatethatthereeitherbenodefinitiongiven(a#h*h#hhhccord U.S.v. #* Walton (4thCir.2000)207F.3d694),#hhh#*hhԀorthatthereisnodefinitionthatthecourt %P , requires.(Illinois,Kansas,Kentucky,Michigan,Mississippi,Oklahoma,Oregon, x&!. Texas,Vermont,Wyoming). '@#0  ` TwoStatesveerclosetoCaliforniasminimal,defectivedefinition h)$2 Washington( adoubtaswouldexistinthemindofareasonableperson...abiding *0&4 beliefinthetruthofthecharge),andFlorida( ifthereisnotanabidingconviction X,'6 OY    ofguilt,orifhavingaconviction,itisonewhichisnotstable,butonewhich  waversandvacillates,thenthechargeisnotprovedbeyondeveryreasonable (x doubt),butCaliforniasinstructions,takenasawhole,mandateconvictionson  mereprobabilities.NoStateappearstohavegonesofarasCaliforniainreducing  h thedefinitionofreasonabledoubtsimplytojurorfeelingsofalastingbelief   establishedbyevidencesatisfactorilyshown.  X   #h*hߔ#*hh ` Thisisstructuralerrorandwillwarrantreversalperseunder Cage ifa    convictionresults. ( Sullivanv.Louisiana( 1993)508U.S.275.)Thiscourt H  certainlyhasthepower(andduty)toimplementtheU.S.Constitutionsguarantee p  thatnopersonisconvictedonlessevidencethanthatrequiredbydueprocessof 8  lawandtheSixthAmendmentrighttotrialbyjuryunderthatstandard.Appellate ` decisionswhichrefusetoreverseconvictionsdonotforbidthiscourtfrom ( implementingtherequiredlanguageoftheU.S.SupremeCourtin Cage and P  Victor byaddingthefewsuggestedwordstotheinstructiontocommunicatethe  constitutionallevelofproof. @  ` Nothingforbidsit.PenalCode1096,asamendedin1995,restatesthe  CALJIC2.90instruction,but1096aalsostatesonlythat ...nofurtherinstruction 0  onthesubjectofthepresumptionofinnocenceorthedefinitionofreasonable " doubt needbegiven. (Emphasisadded.)Thatstatutorylanguageobviouslydoes  p$ notmandatethatnoadditionalwords canbegiven. 󀀀Giventhatthisisthemost  & fundamentalofconstitutionalguaranteesandthattheCALJICPenalCode1096 "`( defectcanberemediedbysimplyaddingafewwordstothecurrentdefective #* instruction,itmustbedone.Specifically,theinstructionwouldjustaddthewords %P , "toanevidentiarycertainty"tothecurrent2.90followingthewords,"abiding x&!. conviction",soitwouldread,"abidingconvictiontoanevidentiarycertaintyinthe '@#0 truthofthecharge."Thecourtshavethedutytocorrectinstructionsthatmay h)$2 deviatefromconstitutionalnorms.#h*hߕ#Chh(See Peoplev.Engelman (2002)28Cal.4th *0&4 436#hCh#hhhԀ#hhh{#Chh(banninga jurorsnitchCALJICinstruction).#hCh߾#hhhԀ#hhh5#*hh X,'6 *X| X*h ` #*h X*X|##h*hx#hhhFurther,"adefendantisentitledtoaninstructionastoanyrecognized  defenseforwhichthereexistsevidencesufficientforareasonablejurytofindin (x hisfavor[citation]." Mathewsv.UnitedStates, 485U.S.58,63(1988);seealso   Taylorv.Kentucky ,436U.S.478,490(1978)("Weholdthatonthefactsofthis  h casethetrialcourt'srefusaltogivepetitioner'srequestedinstructiononthe   presumptionofinnocenceresultedinaviolationofhisrighttoafairtrial.")#hhh#*hh   X   ` The#h*h߲#hhhburdenofprooftellsthefactfinderthedegreeofconfidencesociety    requiresittohaveinthecorrectnessofitsfactualconclusion.#hhh#*hhԀA feelingofan H   abidingconvictioninthetruthofthechargefallsfarshortoftheconstitutional p  minimumandmustbeaddressedintheinstructions. 8  DATE0 0 % % h   Respectfullysubmitted,(%%  `     `     h   AttorneyforDefendant#h*h#